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For Putnam in Representation and Reality, there cannot be any
intentional science, thus dooming cognitive science. His argument
is that intentional concepts are functional, and that functionalism
cannot explain anything because “everything has every functional
organization”, providing a proof. Analyzing his proof, we find that
Putnam is assuming an ideal interpreting subject who can compute
effortlessly and who is not intentional. But the subject doing science
is a human being, and we are not that way. Therefore, in order to
save cognitive science, we propose to replace the ideal subject with
a real and intentional human subject, and we propose to model
intentionality by using a problem theory which is an intuitionist set
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§1 The book
¶1 · In the Introduction to Representation and Reality, Putnam (1988) defines function-
alism and states the aim of his book. For Putnam (page xi) functionalism is “the thesis
that the computer is the right model for the mind.” This “computational view was itself
a reaction against the idea that our matter is more important than our function, that our
what is more important than our how. [. . . ] This much [. . . ] still seems to me [Putnam]
to be as true and important as ever did” (page xii). However, he now (1988) thinks that
functionalism fails to explain intentionality, and therefore his aim in this book is to show
“that the computer analogy, call it the ‘computational view of the mind,’ or ‘functional-
ism,’ or what you will, does not after all answer the question [. . . ] ‘What is the nature of
mental states?’ ” (page xi).
¶2 · Then, the first six out of seven chapters are full of smart arguments showing the
many issues that are found when trying to explain three intentional concepts —truth,
reference, and meaning— from the computational point of view. His own explanations
of these concepts are in the last chapter: “truth is idealized rational acceptability” (page
115), “[reference] is a matter of interpretation”, where “interpretation is an essentially
holistic matter” (page 118), and “meaning is use” but “use is holistic” (page 119). In
page 109, Putnam summarizes his position very clearly:
I do not see any possibility of a scientific theory of the “nature” of the intentional
realm, and the very assumption that such a theory must be possible if there is
something “to” intentional phenomena at all is one that I regard as wholly wrong.
Therefore, for Putnam (1988), cognitive science is doomed. And to save cognitive science,
in this paper we will investigate the possibility of nullifying Putnam’s conclusion.
§2 Meanings are not in the head
¶1 · In reconstructing Putnam’s argument in this book, we have to follow the trail of his
trials to explain the meaning of ‘meaning’. Very early, he realized that mental states, as
for example ‘meaning’, cannot be identified with physical states of the brain. As Putnam
famously wrote in 1975, page 144: “ ‘meaning’ just ain’t in the head!” However, he still
use to think that, according to functionalism, a meaning was a computational state in
the brain, and this book was written to explain that he was wrong about this. Therefore,
again but now extending his mantra to functionalism, Putnam writes in 1988, page 73:
“Meanings aren’t ‘in the head’.”
¶2 · In dealing with the mind and its mental states and properties, which is usually a fuzzy
business, we will use the original mind-body split as defined by Descartes. For Descartes,
minds can think and speak freely, while bodies are completely unfree, like machines.
Then the intentional realm is entirely inside the mental realm, and by implication truth,
reference, meaning, intention, and any other intentional concept, are mental concepts.
Conversely, the physical realm, where nothing is free of the laws of nature, is completely
outside the mental realm.
¶3 · Still under the Cartesian mind-body split, the computational realm is also completely
outside the mental realm, because there is not any freedom in it. In retrospect, this shows
us that Putnam’s movement from physical states to computational states could not help
him to explain the meaning of ‘meaning’. Intentionality is as excluded from computing
as it is excluded from physics.
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§3 The requirement of objectivity
¶1 · As we saw above, Putnam’s conclusion is that mental states and intentionality cannot
be explained scientifically. If this were true, then biology, for example, could not define
its object ‘life’ as the intention of ‘not to die’, which would be the natural way of doing it
because biological organisms are intentional. And, if mental states could not be explained
scientifically, then the status of ‘cognitive science’ as science would be doomed. But, is
it true? Could we save cognitive science?
¶2 · We will call the subject-object split, where the subject is the agent observing and the
object is the patient being observed, the epistemological split. Now, the prohibition of
using intentional concepts in science is a consequence of using the Cartesian mind-body
split for the epistemological split. Then the mindful subject is free, while the mechanical
object is not free. Using the epistemological split, we can reformulate the ban positively,
science has to be objective, or negatively, science cannot be subjective.
¶3 · Its limitation to objective reality was the cause of the huge success of science from
Descartes time, because from then the final judge of any scientific theory is measurement
instead of authority, where measurements are objective and authorities are subjective.
¶4 · Then, Putnam statement about the impossibility of a science of intentions seems
to be a consequence of one requirement put on science, namely, that science has to be
objective. We will call this requirement the requirement of objectivity.
§4 The requirement of physicalism
¶1 · Physics is the paradigm of objective science. Consequently, the aim of every other
branch of science is to be reduced to physics. However, as the reduced branch is not
physics, or otherwise the reduction would not be needed, then the reduction has to make
some trick, some magical refactoring, to achieve its purpose. In fact, every reduction needs
to interpret some physical data as something else in the theory that is being reduced.
Thus, reducing and interpreting are always suspicious.
¶2 · We will call the requirement that any scientific theory has to be reduced to physics,
or else it is not scientific, the requirement of physicalism. This requirement is stronger
than the requirement of objectivity, and for example computing fulfills the requirement
of objectivity, but it does not fulfill the requirement of physicalism. In fact, the main
task of Putnam in the book is to explain why computing cannot be reduced to physics.
§5 Interpretations
¶1 · In order to reduce computing to physics, we need to interpret, for example, some
electrical potentials as symbols, and some physical conditions as a computational halt.
When the engineers are designing a computing device, the intended interpretation is
documented in the technical manual of the computer, but if we allow any arbitrary
interpretation, as argued by Putnam (1988), page 96 with a proof in the Appendix, then
we can interpret any physical system as any computational system.
¶2 · In other words, he presents us a proof that every physical system realizes every
computational system. If this were true, then it would explain why a scientific theory
cannot be computational. And only thus could Putnam affirm both that the computer
is the right model for the mind, and that this model does not explain anything. But, is
he right? Could we save cognitive science?
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¶3 · The main conclusions by Putnam (1988) in this book are negative: computing cannot
be reduced to physics, and consequently intentionality cannot be explained scientifically.
If these negative conclusions could not be overcome, then cognitive science would be
doomed. However, these are the conclusions of some arguments, and those arguments
are based on some assumptions. So our plan now will be to analyze the assumptions, and
to assess their validity. Our final aim is to find a way to overcome the negative results
by Putnam, or as he himself writes at the very end of the Introduction, page xv, to find
“a different —and better— way of thinking about these philosophical issues.”
§6 Two assumptions
¶1 · In the Appendix to Putnam’s book, pages 121–125, there is a proof that “every
ordinary open system is a realization of every abstract finite automaton”, showing that
“everything has every functional organization” (page xv). That is, the Appendix contains
his proof that computing cannot be reduced to physics because every physical system
implements every computational system.
¶2 · In our analysis, which is in the Appendix to this paper in §36, we conclude that
Putnam does not prove the two-part theorem stated, but rather this slightly augmented
three-part theorem: using suitable interpreting functions, every ordinary open system is
a realization of every abstract finite automaton. As a consequence, Putnam’s theorem
holds if we are free to choose the suitable interpreting function for each pair of system and
automaton, but it does not hold if there is an intended interpretation. So, in this case, an
assumption is that there is not any intended interpretation. And even if there were not any
intended interpretation, we would not be free to choose the suitable interpreting function
for each pair of system and automaton should some interpretations were impossible, or
too much difficult. Then another assumption is that any interpretation is as easy as any
other, so every interpretation is as easy as the easiest one, and this only happens to ideal
interpreters. Are these two assumptions right? Let us see some examples.
§7 A wall and a rock
¶1 · Before presenting my own one in the next section, we should mention two famous
examples based on Putnam’s proof: Searle’s wall implementing a word processor program,
and Chalmers’ rock implementing a mind.
¶2 · Searle (1992), pages 208–209, writes:
Thus for example the wall behind my back is right now implementing the Word-
star program, because there is some pattern of molecule movements that is iso-
morphic with the formal structure of Wordstar. But if the wall is implementing
Wordstar, then if it is a big enough wall it is implementing any program, including
any program implemented in the brain.
¶3 · Chalmers (1996), page 309, writes:
Specifically, he [Putnam] claims that every ordinary open system realizes every
abstract finite automaton. He puts this forward as a theorem, and offers a detailed
proof. If this is right, a simple system such as a rock implements any automaton
one might imagine.
Chalmers adds that “this would imply that a rock has a mind”.
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§8 A grenade
¶1 · Instead of using a wall as Searle or a rock as Chalmers, let me instead use an impact
grenade. An impact grenade is a small explosive weapon typically thrown by hand, and
its function is simple: if the safety lever is released and the impact sensor detects an
impact (greater than, say, a 0.9 g shock), then the explosion mechanism is triggered and
the grenade explodes; otherwise the grenade keeps its non-exploding state. To function
this way, there was an engineer who took this functional description and implemented a
physical device that conforms to it. This is the intended interpretation that relates both
ways the functional description with the physical device. In the case of engineered devices,
the intended interpretation is even written in a technical document, so its existence cannot
be denied, I hope.
¶2 · Nevertheless, if you were a godlike subject, that is, an ideal and unintentional subject,
then you would be able to interpret the grenade as a word processor to write this very
paper, as Searle teaches us and Putnam allows us, because you could compute effortlessly
any possible interpretation, and you would not be afraid of being killed by its explosion.
¶3 · However, if you, dear reader, are unfortunately a human subject, then you should
better restrict yourself to the intended interpretation. Firstly because the computations
that you would need to execute in order to interpret the grenade as a word processor
are possibly non-feasible for you and surely absurdly complex, and secondly and most
importantly because you could even die during the exercise.
¶4 · Therefore, in this case, the two assumptions apply in the case of godlike subjects, but
not in the case of real and intentional subjects as ourselves.
¶5 · And although we would not die, we will waste too many computational resources
interpreting a wall as a word processor, or a rock as a mind. The point again is that,
while this would not affect a godlike subject computing effortlessly, in our case we could
not use those wasted resources for calculating more relevant decisions, some possibly
crucial to our life, and in any case better assigned to other tasks. For us, interpreting is
expensive, or at least it is not free, and it has consequences, some perhaps deadly.
§9 Your dog
¶1 · After the wall, the rock, and the grenade, the next case will be a biological object as
your dog, for example, which was engineered by evolution and lacks technical manuals.
And let us name a specific neuron firing pattern happening in the brain of your dog
pattern D. According to Putnam, we can interpret pattern D arbitrarily, and then,
using Searle’s example, pattern D could be interpreted as the function that deletes the
second character of a string, let us call it function d2. That is, if this function d2 takes
the string “good”, then it returns the string “god”.
¶2 · Now, suppose that we ask a cognitive scientist to investigate your dog’s pattern D,
that she set an experiment, and that after some thousand tests she finds that there is
a perfect correlation between pattern D and your dog’s heart increasing its beat rate.
That is, she observes that it is only when pattern D is developing that she measures a
heart beat rate increase, and it is only when she measures a heart beat increase that she
observes pattern D. Her report also indicates correlations, though not perfect, between
pattern D and your dog seeing your neighbor’s cat, between pattern D and higher levels
of adrenaline, and many others.
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¶3 · Why do we understand that the intended interpretation of your dog’s neuron firing
pattern D cannot be function d2? Why do we understand that the intended interpretation
can instead be that the function of pattern D is to increase the beat rate of the heart
of your dog? In the end, because we cannot imagine any way that calculating that
function d2 will bring more or better survival chances to a dog. And, on the other hand,
increasing the beat rate of the heart will increase the oxygen supply to the muscles that
is needed to run, and then we can easily imagine why computing the need of increasing
the heart beat rate would have a value for survival.
§10 Life
¶1 · Every living being is intentional. The intention of every living being is to keep being
alive. The previous sentence is nearly tautological because life is best defined as an
intention. And it is a bit surprising that Putnam (1988), elaborating on intentions, does
not make any reference to this fact.
¶2 · We are just formulating in abstract terms what is plainly known: that the computa-
tions executed by living beings are finally intended to keep that living being alive. And to
live, sometimes the animal needs to run, for example, to flee from a predator. And to run,
the muscles need more oxygen. And to provide more oxygen to the muscles, they have to
receive more blood. And for the muscles to receive more blood, the heart has to pump
more blood. And for pumping more blood, the heart has to beat more frequently. This
chain of intentions links the increase of the bit rate of the heart with the final intention
of every living being, which is to be alive, which is to not die.
¶3 · The intended interpretation of every living being is its final intention, to keep being
alive. As this final intention is embodied in the living being, every one of its parts and
organs and every one of its processes and computations get their intended interpretations.
That living beings are intentional can be reformulated this way: every living being is an
embodied intention.
§11 Intentions and meanings
¶1 · Furthermore, when the interpreting subject is a living being, everything is evaluated
against its final intention: or it is needed to survive, or it only helps to survive, or it is
indifferent for survival, or it is an inconvenience for survival, or it is a deathly danger.
As result of this evaluation for survival, everything gets its intended interpretation. For
example, according to Lettvin et al. (1959), a frog interprets that any dark point that
moves rapidly in its field of vision is a fly which it will try to eat, so frogs interpret flies as
needed to survive. Of course, this evaluation for survival does not need to be computed,
but it has to be somehow embodied; green plants need sunlight to survive.
¶2 · The general idea is that death is the final meaning, because avoiding death is the final
intention, and that this absolute meaning propagates. Those other meanings depend
on the species and, for species that can learn, also on the individual. Although by the
above explanations it could seem that everything has a meaning for every living being,
this is not necessarily true. For example, the planet Saturn can be meaningless for frogs,
because Saturn is inconsequential for frogs survival. If even more remote astronomical
objects than Saturn have some meaning for us, it is because we accumulate meanings
just in case, a trick sometimes useful for survival, which we use.
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§12 Human subject
¶1 · For any ideal and unintentional subject, any interpretation is as easy as the easiest
one and there is not any intended interpretation. From the point of view of such a godlike
subject, Putnam’s theorem is true and “everything has every functional organization.”
However, for real and intentional subjects as ourselves, both assumptions are false: for a
real subject not every interpretation is as easy as any other, and for an intentional subject
there is an intended interpretation. In principle, this does not show that the theorem is
false, it only means that the theorem does not apply to us.
¶2 · In any case, now that we know of two assumptions that prevent to explain the in-
tentional realm scientifically, we can explore what would result if we negate those two
assumptions. Therefore, we will assume instead that the subject is real and intentional,
that is, we will assume that the subject is an embodied intention, a living subject. In
particular, we will investigate the case of a human subject, because we know that Put-
nam’s conclusions do not apply to living subjects as ourselves, and because we are the
subjects doing science.
¶3 · In what follows, we will show constructively that a science of intentions is possible
and that cognitive science is not doomed. As in any constructive proof, the construction
presented is not necessarily unique, but only an instance.
§13 The requirement of subjectivity
¶1 · The first casualty of assuming a human subject is the requirement of objectivity,
see §3. As we saw above, for living subjects everything has an intended interpretation,
and for human subjects everything has a meaning. And, although the final intention of
every living subject is to keep being alive, the intended interpretations and meanings that
propagate from the final intention depend on the species, and for the species that can
learn also on the individual. As we can learn, in our case the intended interpretations and
meanings depend on the species and also on the individual. In any case, the conclusion
is that, for a human subject, science has to be subjective.
¶2 · This conclusion is quite natural. If you reread Representation and Reality from this
point of view, you will find that nearly every issue disappears. Intentions and meanings,
which Putnam cannot imagine inside science, are naturally included inside science even
before we start doing science, because intentions and meanings, finally rooted on life and
death, are how we human subjects see everything through.
¶3 · At first, it could seem us that letting science to indulge into subjectivity is too high a
price to pay. In ancient times, authority, who in medieval Europe was Aristotle tailored
by the Church, was revered so much that science was stagnated. It was only when
science theories were judged on how good they predicted measurements, instead of being
sanctioned by the authority, that science was able to grow steadily. This is the method
of science, on which Popper and Feyerabend can shed some light.
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§14 The method of science
¶1 · It was Popper who gave the most precise definition of science: scientific theories
have to be falsifiable by measurements. This definition requires objectivity, because if
something cannot be measured, then it is out of science. And mental events cannot be
measured, since they require an interpretation, so they are out of science.
¶2 · For Popper the method of science is based on trial and error. He explained it several
times, but we will copy here the explanation that is included in page 3 of his 1994 book
All Life Is Problem Solving :
The natural as well as the social sciences always start from problems, from the
fact that something inspires amazement in us, as the Greek philosophers used to
say. To solve these problems, the sciences use fundamentally the same method
that common sense employs, the method of trial and error. To be more precise, it
is the method of trying out solutions to our problem and then discarding the false
ones as erroneous. This method assumes that we work with a large number
of experimental solutions. One solution after another is put to the test and
eliminated.
¶3 · However, scientists do not always practice science following Popper’s method, which is
mechanical, objective, ideal. Being intentional, scientists try to explain how nature works
by using whatever helps them. In Against Method, page 19, Feyerabend (1988) summa-
rizes the situation: “anything goes”. Being himself a polemicist, this is an overstatement.
By exaggerating it, Feyerabend makes his point clearer: science is not objective, because
science is practiced by real and intentional subjects.
¶4 · Should we then admit Feyerabend’s anarchist conclusion that there is no scientific
method? I do not think so. Although I will not present here a complete reformulation for
the scientific method, I am sure that science has some limits. Let us take, for example,
homeopathy, and let us suppose that homeopathic remedies by themselves neither cause
harm nor benefit. Now take any naturally mortal disease that medicine cures. In this case,
if medicine is used, then the patient will survive, and otherwise the patient will die. That
is, the patient will die if homeopathy is used instead of medicine, or if neither homeopathy
nor medicine is used. This would prove that medicine is science and homeopathy is not
science, because medicine is effective against death while homeopathy is not.
¶5 · That we are still debating today about the scientific status of something as home-
opathy that can cause death by omission shows that, in fact, Feyerabend is closer than
Popper to define the method of science. Furthermore, let us make another supposition:
it is found that some investigators who had published scientific papers suggesting some
benefits of homeopathy are paid by a company producing homeopathic remedies. This
would be considered a conflict of interest because scientists are real intentional subjects.
Therefore, in the demarcation of science and its method we have to include the purpose
of science, perhaps producing unbiased knowledge, and we should take into account that
its agents are human, and therefore intentional.
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§15 Relativism
¶1 · Subjectivism implies relativism only when the subject is ideal and unintentional.
When the subject is alive, then subjectivism does not imply relativism.
¶2 · Usually subjectivism is neglected by arguing that, if we let that every subject be his
own judge, then anything would be as good as anything: anything goes. This could be
true for unintentional subjects who find anything as good as anything, but it is not true
for living subjects, because for every living subject life is better than death, pleasure is
better than pain, and eating is better than starving. Death is absolute for us.
¶3 · Furthermore, if a judge is in fact intentional, then it is better to be explicit on his
intentions than to ignore them. It happens the same in politics, where it is not a good
idea to assume that politicians will always work for their people needs, and it is much
better for the society that its political system takes into account that politicians have
their own personal needs, aspirations, and ambitions, which can conflict with those of
their people. When there are intentional agents playing, to ignore the fact that they are
intentional will distort everything. We should repeat it: the method of science has to
consider that their actors are intentional.
¶4 · However, we human subjects have much more commonalities than differences, where
the commonalities are given by our genome, and our differences by what each of us has
learned, which depends on our culture and on our individual way. It is only because
our human interests and intentions are basically the same that an extincted and long
forgotten language can be reconstructed from its written record.
¶5 · Let us summarize the situation of science. There would be no science without some
human beings purposely doing science. Then, the subject of science is human. So science,
as any other human enterprise, is defined by its purpose, and its method is any that
human beings could find to achieve that purpose. Although it has some merit, it is not
completely true that anything goes, because we human subjects are intentional living
beings sharing much more commonalities than differences.
§16 The requirement of biologism
¶1 · The second casualty of assuming a human subject is the requirement of physicalism,
see §4. This, in fact, is just a consequence of the first one, because physicalism entails
objectivism. Assuming a living subject requires biologism, that is, that science be reduced
to biology. However, it is more than that. Today, under the physicalist requirement,
biology is a branch of chemistry, which is a branch of physics. Therefore, biology itself
should firstly be fully reoriented towards intentions; life is an intention, in fact it is the
final intention. And only after that redefinition, should science be reduced to biology. The
conclusion is that, for subjective science, science has to be based on subjective biology in
order to be intentional.
¶2 · All this is easier to say than to implement. As science is currently based on the re-
quirement of physicalism, this requirement permeates everything scientific. For example,
the mathematical function is found nearly everywhere, because it models causality: as in
causality, where the same cause always produces the same effect, in a function the same
argument always produces the same value. Functions are used extensively in determinis-
tic theories, as Einstein’s relativity theory, and also in probabilistic theories, as quantum
mechanics, where the arguments and values can be probabilities. In any case, functions
lack intentionality, and then it is not possible to build a subjective science on them.
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§17 Intuitionism
¶1 · Our task now will be to look for a mathematical concept that models intention.
And, from the beginning, we have to avoid formalism, because mathematics is purely
syntactic for formalism. That is, for formalism, mathematics is just the manipulation
of strings of symbols, which are free of meaning, according to exact rules. What we are
looking for is intuitionism, because for intuitionism mathematics is the result of human
thought. Consequently, in intuitionism a mathematical statement can be true, or false,
or unknown, which corresponds respectively to say that some mathematician has proved
that the statement is true, or that someone has proved that the statement is false, or
that no one has found a mathematical proof on the truth or falsity of the statement.
¶2 · Let us translate set theory, which is the foundation of mathematics, to intuitionism.
There are two ways of defining a set:
◦ By extension (denotation): when we enumerate the elements of the set.
◦ By intension (connotation): when we express the precise condition that anything has
to fulfill to be an element of the set.
Whenever we have a set defined by intension, a set defined by extension, and a proof
that both are equal, we will say that both sets are the same set, but defined differently.
For formalism and other objectivisms, a set defined by intension and a set defined by
extension are either the same set or they are not the same set. However, for intuitionism
and other subjectivisms, there is a third possibility: that the subject does not know
whether they are the same or not. Only by allowing this third possibility can problems
exist, because a problem is a state of ignorance.
¶3 · The most abstract way of seeing a problem is as the list of requirements that anything
has to fulfill to be a solution to that problem. Therefore, we will say that a set defined by
intension is a problem, and the same set but defined by extension is its set of solutions.
And we will say that to resolve a problem is to calculate its set of solutions, though most
times it will be enough to calculate one of its solutions to solve the problem. In any
case, in subjectivism, set theory has three parts: A problem, which is a state of need,




§18 The law of Turing
¶1 · Solutions are elements, as in set theory. Problems are predicates on the set of el-
ements that are true for solutions and false for everything else. And resolutions, what
are resolutions? Resolutions have to model the calculating capacity of the subject doing
mathematics, and therefore we have to choose something that models our human calcu-
lating capacity. The answer to this seemingly impossible question was given by Turing
(1936), who postulated that a problem is unresolvable if and only if there is not any
Turing machine that can calculate its solution. That is, he posited that ‘resolvable’ is
synonymous with ‘calculable by a Turing machine’, which is nowadays synonymous with
‘computable’. Therefore, for Turing, computing is the model for the resolutions.
¶2 · In order to be formal and ceremonial, we will raise an aspect of this statement to the
status of the first law of cognition under the name of his champion.
The law of Turing: computing is for solving problems.
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¶3 · The law of Turing is twice intentional. The first time because it declares the inten-
tion of computing. Under objectivism, computing cannot have any intention, and then
Putnam (1988) and Searle (1980 and 1992) are right when they argue that computing by
itself is meaningless. However, under Turing’s law, computing has an intention, which
is to solve problems, and then computing is a means to an end, and consequently the
meaning of any computation comes from the problem that the computation resolves, or
tries to resolve.
¶4 · The law of Turing is twice intentional. The second time because the intention of
computing is solving problems, and problem solving is our mathematical model for inten-
tionality. A problem expresses a need, an intention, that is satisfied by a solution, and
to find a solution to the problem we have to compute a solving resolution.
¶5 · Problem solving, being our mathematical model for intentionality, and life, being an
intention, then life is the problem of survival and evolution is its resolver.
¶6 · Going back to the beginning of this section, mathematically under the law of Turing,
solutions are elements, problems are predicates, and resolutions are computable functions,
which are also known as (general) recursive functions.
§19 A kind of miracle
¶1 · As cited by Davis (1982), page 16, for Gödel, by a kind of miracle, computability is
absolute, that is, independent of the language used to define it:
Tarski has stressed in his lecture (and I think justly) the great importance of the
concept of general recursiveness (or Turing’s computability). It seems to me that
this importance is largely due to the fact that with this concept one has for the first
time succeeded in giving an absolute definition of an interesting epistemological
notion, i.e., one not depending on the formalism chosen. In all other cases treated
previously, such as demonstrability or definability, one has been able to define
them only relative to a given language, and for each individual language it is
clear that the one thus obtained is not the one looked for. For the concept of
computability however, although it is merely a special kind of demonstrability or
decidability[,] the situation is different. By a kind of miracle it is not necessary to
distinguish orders, and the diagonal procedure does not lead outside the defined
notion.
¶2 · Computing is independent of the language used to define it because, in fact, for any
language to exist, a computing device has to implement the language. In other words,
languages cannot exist by themselves, but every language is computed.
¶3 · That every language is computable provides us with another point of view from which
to observe Putnam’s difficulties with intentionality. That every language is computable
implies that every language has to be implemented by a computing device. To ignore this
fact, by assuming that there can be a language without a computing device implementing
it, was one of Putnam’s two assumptions that we are nullifying. And the other one was
assuming no intentionality, also taken into account by Turing’s law. Thus, the law of
Turing goes straight against Putnam’s assumptions preventing a cognitive science.
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§20 Turing completeness
¶1 · Aside from computing absoluteness, and also by kind of miracle, computing shows
another surprising property: Turing completeness, or completeness for short; you can find
more details in Casares (TC). It happens that there are some computing devices that can
imitate the calculations of any computing device, and we will say that those imitating
computing devices are Turing complete. To do the imitation, part of the data entered to
the Turing complete device is a description of the imitated computing device. We will
call that description the program, which is written in a complete language. That is, a
complete language is the language of a Turing complete device, and then we can describe
any computing device in any complete language.
¶2 · The universal Turing (1936) machine is the mathematical model for Turing complete
devices, and then Turing completeness is also known as universal computing.
¶3 · Using the software-hardware split, where hardware refers to the computing device
and software refers to its data, Turing completeness can be defined as the capacity of
some hardware devices to compute by software whatever hardware can compute. It will
be important for what follows to note that, in the software-hardware split, reality and its
objects are hardware, while language and its concepts are software.
§21 Problem theory
¶1 · Taking advantage of the law of Turing, it is easy to devise a problem theory by mixing
intuitionist set theory and computing theory. The details are in Casares (PT), and now
we will summarize some results that are interesting here.
¶2 · For each problem there is a corresponding set of solutions, its set of solutions. The
set of problems is a Boolean algebra, and the set of sets of solutions is a Boolean algebra,
too. For each problem there is a corresponding set of solutions, but there are some sets of
solutions that are not the set of solutions of any problem. In other words, there are sets
that can be defined by extension that cannot be defined by intension. This unexpected
result, which is a reformulation of Gödel’s (1930) incompleteness theorem as pointed out
by Post (1944), precludes the isomorphism between the set of problems and the set of
sets of solutions; they are quasi-isomorphic.
¶3 · Given a problem, to find a resolution that computes its solutions is another problem,
which we call its meta-problem. Therefore, a solution of its meta-problem is a solving
resolution of the original problem. For example, in a problem of arithmetical calculation,
the solution is a number and the solving resolution is an algorithm, which is, for example,
the algorithm for multiplication when ‘by multiplying’ is the solution to its meta-problem.
It takes 3 eggs to make a cake. How many eggs do you need to make 24 cakes?
¶4 · As the meta-problem of a problem is also a problem, the meta-problem of its meta-
problem is the meta-meta-problem of the original problem, and so on. However, after
mixing set theory with computing, every set is countable and “it is not necessary to
distinguish orders”. In particular, the set of problems, the set of sets of solutions and
the set of resolutions are infinite enumerable, and meta-meta-problems, meta-meta-meta-
problems and so on are all meta-problems.
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¶5 · The problem theory defines three ways of resolving a problem: by routine, by trial,
and by analogy.
◦ You resolve a problem by routine when you know a solution, so you only need to
apply the solution to solve the problem. One element that is a solution is enough to
resolve by routine.
◦ Resolving by trial is testing a set of possible solutions until finding one that solves
the problem. A set of elements that can be solutions is needed to resolve by trial.
◦ Resolving by analogy is transforming a problem into another problem, the analogue
problem. The analogue problem can also be transformed by analogy and so on, but
when a solving resolution is known, transforming a problem into its meta-problem by
analogy terminates the loop.
§22 The law of evolution
¶1 · When the three ways of resolving, which are routine, trial and analogy, are applied
to problems and meta-problems we get a series of five resolvers of increasing problem
solving power: mechanism, adapter, perceiver, learner, and subject.
¶2 · This series provides a framework for the evolution of cognition on the assumption
that sometimes solving more problems is evolutionarily better. It is only sometimes,
because design is always a trade-off between resources and achievements, independently
of it is done by evolution or by a human engineer. In the case of this series, an evolution
of resolvers —mechanism to adapter to perceiver to learner to subject— should follow
provided that a bigger problem solving range means more survival opportunities, that
in each step the increasing of complexity is compensated by its increased fitness, that
software is cheaper than hardware, and that the adapter, the perceiver, the learner, and
the subject conditions are satisfied in some environments. You can find more details
about these conditions in Casares (PT). For us here, it is important to note that the
subject condition is to be Turing complete,
¶3 · It is with those qualifications on the word ‘sometimes’, that we can express another
law of cognition.
The law of evolution: sometimes, solving more problems is evolutionarily better.
§23 The law of Einstein
¶1 · That software is cheaper than hardware can be eliminated from the list of provisions
to the law of evolution, because it is another law of cognition.
The law of Einstein: software is much cheaper than hardware.
¶2 · This law is named after Einstein (1905) because it is the computational version of
the E = mc2 equation of his theory of relativity. As hardware is matter seen from the
point of view of computing, and software is energy seen from the same viewpoint, then
software is c2 times cheaper than hardware. You can find more details in Casares (TC).
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§24 The evolution of cognition
¶1 · Using problem solving as the mathematical model for intentionality, and being life an
intention, then life is the problem of survival and evolution is its resolver. Furthermore,
under the provisions of the law of evolution, an evolution of resolvers should develop from
mechanism to adapter, then to perceiver, next to learner, and finally to subject.
Body Brain
Routine Meta-routine
one Mechanism ℜ0 Perceiver ℜ2 element
s ∈ S f ∈ (S → S)
Trial Meta-trial
some Adapter ℜ1 Learner ℜ3 set
S ∈ S → B F ∈ (S → S) → B
Analogy Meta-analogy
internal Perceiver ℜ2 Subject ℜ4 function
f ∈ S → S f ∈ (S → S) → (S → S)
Behavior Model
S S → S
¶2 · A mechanism is an implementation in hardware of a single element, and then it only
solves those problems for which that element is a solution. In that case, a mechanism
implements a solution, and it represents the case when we know a solution to the problem,
so we can apply it routinely. A living mechanism has a body implementing a single fixed
behavior, so it can only survive in a specific, benign, and very stable environment, as it
is the case of some extremophile archaea. Mechanisms resolve problems by routine.
¶3 · An adapter is an implementation in hardware of a predicate on elements, or equiv-
alently of a set of elements. It represents a trial on a set of possible solutions. A living
adapter has a body that can execute a set of behaviors, so that, in order to adapt itself
to the current situation, it can choose one of them by using a trial and error procedure
or a trigger condition, as a deciduous tree does. Adapters resolve problems by trial.
¶4 · A perceiver is an implementation in hardware of a single fixed function on elements to
elements. It implements an analogy that transforms a problem into an analogue problem,
which also needs a solution. When the implemented function is a solving resolution, the
problem can be solved, representing the case when, though we do not know a solution,
we know a way to find one. In this case, the analogue problem is the meta-problem, and
knowing only a solving resolution of the problem is knowing a single and fixed solution
for its meta-problem. A living perceiver has a body and a brain. The perceiver brain
implements a single fixed function that translates sensations into perceptions, so the
perceiver chooses its body behavior on its perceived reality, which is a fixed model of
the exterior. For perceivers, reality is hardwired in their brains, but inside their brains,
perceivers resolve in software, either by routine or by trial. From Lettvin et al. (1959)
description, we conclude that a frog is a perceiver. Perceivers resolve problems by analogy
or meta-problems by routine.
¶5 · A learner is an implementation in hardware of a predicate on functions from elements
to elements, or equivalently of a set of functions on elements to elements. It represents
a trial on a set of possible analogies. A living learner has a body that can execute a set
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of behaviors and a brain that implements a set of functions. Thus a learner can modify
its perceived reality, which is therefore an updatable model of the exterior. When its
current model fails, it selects a new one, thus learning something new about its exter-
nal environment. Inside their brains, learners resolve in software by computing against
current reality, which is also in software, at least in part. A dog is a living learner.
Darwinian evolution is also a learning process, because it resolves and models in genetic
material, which is software. The brain-body distinction in living learners corresponds to
the genotype-phenotype distinction of evolution. Eventually, a theory of the evolution
of evolution should explain how evolution reached its current state, and meanwhile we
can already note that learning is not the first stage in problem solving. Learners resolve
meta-problems by trial.
¶6 · A subject is an implementation in hardware of a function on functions to functions. It
represents an analogy on analogies. When the subject condition is met, that function is
the universal function, which is the function implemented by a universal Turing machine,
and then the subject is Turing complete. A Turing complete subject can reason about
any model and about any learning strategy, effectively translating to software the whole
problem solving process, because it can compute in software whatever hardware can
compute. A living subject has a body and a Turing complete brain. We humans are
Turing complete subjects. Subjects resolve meta-problems by analogy.
§25 A joke
¶1 · This is not for your amusement, but because it will be important in the following
pair of sections. We quote it from Barwise & Etchemendy (1999), pages 304–305:
The ambiguities become especially vexing with quantified noun phrases.
Consider, for example, the following joke, taken from Saturday Night Live:
Every minute a man is mugged in New York City.
We are going to interview him tonight.
What makes this joke possible is the ambiguity in the first sentence.
¶2 · Ambiguity is resolved pragmatically, so for example if the replace the word ‘minute’
with the word ‘year’, then it would not be a joke, because then it would be possible
though unlikely, and then news, that they were referring every time to one and the same
man. We will note ‘â’ this use of the indefinite article; you can read ‘â’ as ‘a specific’.
We will note ‘ã’ the other case, that is, when the reference does not point every time
necessarily to one and the same referent, but each time to a possibly different element
belonging to the set. So ‘â’ refers to a specific member of the set, and ‘ã’ refers to a
generic member of the set, which can change each time.
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§26 The law of Post
¶1 · That computing is the model for resolutions has another aspect that is not in the law
of Turing: that the resolver and the subject doing mathematics is human. Turing (1936)
argues that his computing model, the Turing machine, which is extremely simple and
lacks any intelligence, can calculate anything that any human being can calculate. The
thesis is that anything that we can calculate can also be calculated by ã Turing machine.
An equivalent formulation says that anything that we can calculate can also be calculated
by â universal Turing machine. In any case, we will call this thesis Turing’s thesis.
¶2 · Church (1935) had previously proposed that anything that we can calculate can
also be calculated by â λ-calculus interpreter, a thesis known as Church’s thesis, but
Gödel preferred computing, see Davis (1982), and in the end Turing (1937) proved that
computing and λ-calculus are equivalent, and therefore Turing’s thesis and Church’s
thesis are equivalent.
¶3 · This time we will be subjective, and we will raise Turing’s and Church’s theses to a
cognitive law, the fundamental one, under the name of Post. Note that technically, as
shown in Casares (CT), Church’s thesis is a logical consequence of the law of Post as
expressed here.
The law of Post: in calculating capacity, we are just Turing complete.
¶4 · Why Post? It is easy to be sympathetic with Post, because in spite of his difficult life
he anticipated Gödel and Turing, though being always second, he got no credit. Citing
Stillwell (2004), page 3:
In the 1920s he discovered the incompleteness and unsolvability theorems that
later made Gödel and Turing famous. Post missed out on the credit because he
failed to publish his results soon enough, or in enough detail.
This is nice, but again not enough. However, he indeed deserves to name the fundamental
law of cognition, because Post (1936) was the first one to affirm that Church’s thesis is
a natural law stating the limitations of the mathematicizing power of our species Homo
sapiens. In this he was against Church (1937) himself, for whom his thesis is just a
definition, thus disqualifying Church to name this law.
¶5 · From other points of view, Turing completeness seems to be the final achievement
absolutely possible in computing, but from a subjectivist point of view, completeness is
just a consequence of our limited calculating power. We cannot imagine more calculating
power because we have not more calculating power, so we conclude that our calculating
power is the maximum calculating power. In any case, that we see completeness as the
maximum calculating power is an argument in favor of the law of Post.
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§27 Hardware and software
¶1 · Some people confuse Turing completeness with computing. I put part of the blame on
using ‘unrestricted computing’ to refer to computing in general, as done by the influential
Chomsky (1959), page 143: “A type 0 grammar (language) is one that is unrestricted.¶
Type 0 grammars are essentially Turing machines”. As Turing machines are the mathe-
matical models for hardware devices, then ‘unrestricted computing’ is whatever hardware
can compute, while ‘universal computing’ is a property of some hardware devices that can
compute by software whatever hardware can compute. But the difference gets blurred
if the distinction between hardware and software is ignored, and we Turing complete
subjects are perhaps prone to ignore it because for us software is as capable as hardware.
¶2 · If we fail to notice the accents added over the indefinite article ‘a’ in the dual for-
mulation of Turing’s thesis above, then ‘Turing machine’ and ‘universal Turing machine’
seem to be the same, thus confusing unrestricted computing with universal computing.
So I put another part of the blame on this ambiguity of English.
¶3 · Let us see an example. Berwick & Chomsky (2016) write, in page 134:
Consider a Turing machine, which after all ought to be able to carry out any
computation at all.
This is ambiguous, misleading, and confusing. It is true that, for any specific computation,
there is a specific Turing machine that carries it out. However, a specific Turing machine
carries out one specific computation, and one is not any. In other words, the considered
Turing machine is â hardware device that carries out just one specific computation. And
a specific universal Turing machine can be programmed to carry out any computation
at all, but not every Turing machine is a universal Turing machine, meaning that not
every hardware device is universal. Part of the trick is to understand that the specific
universal Turing machine is also carrying out one specific computation, that of emulating
any specific Turing machine, which is given to the universal one as software.
¶4 · Only confusing unrestricted computing with universal computing can Berwick &
Chomsky (2016) fall into the Turing machine trap, as they call it (pages 131–132):
It seems that insect navigation, like that of dead-reckoning ants returning with
food to their nests, requires the ability to “read from” and “write to” simple
tape-like memory cells. But if so, that’s all one needs for a Turing machine. So
if all this is true, then ants have already climbed all the way up Nature’s ladder.
They are implying that because ants already do computations, which could be qualified
as unrestricted computations following Chomsky (1959), then ants are “able to carry out
any computation at all”, without any restriction. The implication is wrong, because it
confuses unrestricted computing with universal computing. Let us compare, for example,
ants computing power with our universal computing power. By being Turing complete,
we can be instructed to compute any algorithm whatever, for example the algorithm for
multiplication, while ants can neither receive instructions nor be programmed in any way,
but ants always compute the same fixed algorithm. Using the “ladder” presented in §24,
ants are perceivers and we are Turing complete subjects.
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§28 Philosophy
¶1 · After identifying life with the problem of survival, the law of Turing entails that
resolving the survival problem is computing. A frog perceiving a fly is computing, a
dead-reckoning ant is computing, and a human thinking and speaking is computing, too.
Therefore, computability is a category, as conceived by Kant (1781, 1787), that is, a
condition that any mental construct has to satisfy necessarily.
¶2 · While for Kant the categories were transcendental, for us the categories are just a
consequence of the way our brain is and works, which is a consequence of its evolutionary
design, and then intentional. In other words, the categories neither guide us to seek truth,
nor towards ethical justice, nor to wise knowledge, but they are what they are just to
keep us alive. Of course, Kant, having preceded Darwin (1859), was not in a position
to say that the categories are evolutionary, but we are and we do: the categories are
evolutionary.
¶3 · Computability is the only category that extends all over brainy life, but there are other
subcategories. For example, Turing completeness qualifies only our human conceptual
machinery, which is responsible of our linguistic and reasoning abilities. According to
the law of Post, we are just Turing complete. Being Turing complete means that we can
think and say anything that is computable, and being just Turing complete means that
anything that we can think or say has to be computable.
¶4 · Other subcategories are requirements imposed by perception, which is also computed
by the brain. Here we will only mention that our percepts are objects, that is, substantive
things with contingent properties. Although this should be the source of another law of
cognition, perhaps the law of perception, we will not go into more details here.
¶5 · In summary, our Post-Kantian position differs from Kant in two points:
◦ what is the list of the categories, and
◦ that for us the categories are evolutionary, rather than transcendental.

































www.ramoncasares.com 20190922 Intention 20
§29 Reality is an illusion
¶1 · Exaggerating a bit, Kant’s Copernican revolution is acknowledging that reality is an
illusion. What we take for real, for example a gray stone, is not out there. According to
physics, there are perhaps some strange particles and fields out there, but there is not
for sure any stone out there, and therefore the gray stone we are seeing is an illusion
fabricated by our brain.
¶2 · As the Necker cube illusion, the illusion of reality is bistable. Before
experiencing Kant’s Copernican revolution, objective reality is outside.
And Kant’s Copernican revolution is switching to realize that objective
reality is inside. Although it was more than thirty years ago, I still
remember vividly the first time I switched, the moment I underwent
my Kant’s Copernican revolution, the moment of my enlightenment.
¶3 · The illusion of reality is not easy to accept. Any philosopher for whom the problem of
qualia refers to colors but not to things has not experienced Kant’s Copernican revolution.
According to the law of perception, both the things and its properties are products of
our perception, and then neither the thing (the stone) nor its properties (its color gray)
are out there.
¶4 · I guess that Putnam in 1988 had not experienced Kant’s Copernican revolution either,
because starting at its very title, Representation and Reality , he ignores the subject who
is representing reality.
§30 Splits
¶1 · Representation and Reality by Putnam (1988) is about the representation-reality split.
And while we were investigating that fissure, we have found another four splits:
◦ The mind-body split by Descartes, where the mind is free and the body is unfree.
◦ The subject-object split of epistemology, where the subject is the agent observing
and the object is the patient being observed.
◦ The software-hardware split of computing, where software is data and hardware is
the physical device.
◦ The energy-matter split of physics, which was unified by Einstein.
¶2 · Though they are very different in origin, the partitions generated by these five splits
are the same, as they divide the world in the same two parts: one which is perceptual
and the other which is conceptual.
◦ Perceptual: reality, body, object, hardware, and matter.
These are perceivable, that is, products of our perception.
◦ Conceptual: representation, mind, subject, software, and energy.
These are not perceivable, but they are available through our language.
We will refer to these five splits without distinctions as the concept-percept split.
¶3 · Whenever it is considered that the gap caused by a split is unbridgeable, there is a
dualism. The mind-body dualism caused by Descartes’ split is the most famous dualism.
However, for us, the concept-percept split is just a consequence of the way our brain is
and works, that is, another Kantian category. And our brain is and works as it is and
works because of our evolutionary history, which is reconstructed in §24:
◦ from mechanism to adapter: the body extends its inventory of behaviors.
◦ from adapter to perceiver: a simple brain models the exterior so adaptation is inte-
riorized.
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◦ from perceiver to learner: the brain extends its inventory of models.
◦ from learner to subject: the brain achieves Turing completeness allowing a fully
linguistic modeling so learning is interiorized.
Therefore, the perceiver finishes the first interiorization and the Turing complete subject
finishes the second. In us, the first interiorization produces percepts, the second one
concepts, and both together the concept-percept split.
§31 Physics
¶1 · From our Post-Kantian point of view, the laws of nature are not ruling what happens
outside, they are not out there waiting for us to be discovered. For us, the laws of
nature are written by scientists, so they are linguistic concepts under the law of Post,
that is, algorithms. Therefore, for physics and for any empirical science which relies on
measurements, the laws of nature are the best algorithms that scientists have written till
now for forecasting what we would measure should we set a scenario.
¶2 · That the laws of nature are written by scientists is what should be expected from any
subjectivist science. And this is what the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory
is saying. For example, as cited by Gregory (1988) in Inventing Reality, page 185, Bohr
said: “It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out how nature is. Physics
concerns only what we can say about nature.”
¶3 · And Heisenberg (1958), chapter III in pages 18–32, who is the other founder of the
Copenhagen interpretation, expounds on the subjectivism that quantum theory requires.
In page 29, he writes: “This division [between the ‘object’ and the rest of the world]
is arbitrary and historically a direct consequence of our scientific method; the use of
classical concepts is finally a consequence of the general human way of thinking.” He also
explains how to reinterpret Kant’s “a priori” under the light of modern science, pointing
to biology (page 65), as we are doing here.
¶4 · In addition, the energy-matter split of physics was explained away by Einstein (1905)
in his theory of relativity. While energy and matter are equivalent, they are different
physical concepts because they seem completely different to us, the subjects of science.
§32 Self reference
¶1 · If for physics subjectivism is a requisite found only when reaching the subtleties of
the matter, for cognitive science subjectivism is a prerequisite. It is not possible to start
doing cognitive science without taking into account the subject who is doing cognitive
science, because the object of cognitive science is its subject. Self reference and cognitive
science are indissoluble.
¶2 · Self reference is tricky, and nearly paradoxical. The simplest paradox, which is the
sentence “this sentence is false”, is self referential, while its conjugate “this sentence is
true” is as simple and as self referential, but it is not paradoxical; it is empty. In any case,
self reference creates a loop, and whenever the loop is not finished there is a paradox. In
computing, the only way to define a paradox is by expressing a loop that never halts.
¶3 · Reference is one of the three intentional concepts investigated by Putnam (1988),
because reference links a real object with its name, where the name is the representation
of the real object in the language. So reference is the fundamental source of language
meanings, and the primary link between representation and reality.
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¶4 · For self reference to be possible, a linguistic concept, typically a sentence, has to refer
to itself, that is, a linguistic concept has to refer to a linguistic concept. In objectivism,
which keeps separated representation and reality, there is no room for self reference,
because in objectivism reference always points to a real object, and real objects are not
linguistic concepts, thus preventing loops and consequently avoiding paradoxes, which
are infinite loops.
¶5 · Contrariwise, in subjectivism under the law of Post, self reference is unavoidable,
because every complete language is full referable, as explained in Casares (TC), which
includes being self referable. Full reference means that in our complete language we can
refer to any real object and to any linguistic concept. We can refer to your dog, to a
specific neuron firing pattern happening in the brain of your dog, to this very sentence,
to this paper, to the set of all papers that you have not read, to the set of all sets that are
not members of themselves, and so on and on. And the conclusion is that, by allowing
self reference, cognitive science is possible in subjectivism under the law of Post. Another
not-so-nice conclusion is that paradoxes are unavoidable in subjectivism under the law
of Post.
§33 Cognitive science
¶1 · With self reference making cognitive science possible, we close the circle. For Putnam
(1988), intentionality cannot be scientific, thus dooming cognitive science, and our aim
here was to find a way to save cognitive science. Analyzing Putnam’s argument, we
found that his idealization, which ignores the subject representing reality, assumes an
unintentional subject for whom any calculation is as easy as the easiest one. But we are
the subjects doing science and we are not that way. So our plan to save cognitive science
was to replace Putnam’s ideal subject with a human subject.
¶2 · Although some parts of our proposal are more tentative, this subjectivist movement
seems necessary: in cognitive science the object is the subject, so the subject cannot be
obviated, and the subject has to be self referring. How to characterize the human subject
is, of course, more tentative. In our case, in order to deal mathematically with intentions,
we have devised a problem theory by incorporating computing to an intuitionist set
theory.
¶3 · Computing kind-of-miraculous properties are crucial:
◦ Computing is absolute because, for any language to exist, a computing device has to
implement the language.
◦ Computing can be universal, or Turing complete, because there are some computing
devices that can be programmed to imitate any computing device.
◦ We are just Turing complete, so we can compute by software whatever hardware can
compute, and our language is complete and therefore full and self referable.
◦ The software-hardware split of computing is readily open to inspection, and then it
is easier to examine than the other splits.
¶4 · Then, we defined life as the intention; all other intentions derive from life. Therefore,
using the concepts of the problem theory, life is the problem of survival and evolution is
its resolver. Individual living beings are embodied intentions, and then also resolvers for
the theory of problems. Under certain circumstances, an evolution of resolvers happens
that undergoes two interiorizations, the first one producing percepts and the second one
concepts, resulting in a Turing complete species, as ours.
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¶5 · So, as illustrated by the figure in page 19, we are living beings who transform the
external phenomena that interact with us, which are the raw sensations, into a reality of
perceived objects, which are substantive things with contingent properties, and who on
top of that fabricated reality can create linguistic concepts thus extending objective reality
into a wider conceptual world. However, we are still living beings, embodied intentions,
and therefore we are equipped with all this machinery for just one single purpose: to not
die.
¶6 · It is only after this evolutionary history that has designed our human brain in the
way that biology and cognitive science should explain, that some human beings begin to
do science and physics, and that some other human beings begin to question the concept-
percept split. This is why biology can explain physics, by explaining the subject doing
physics, but physics cannot explain biology.
¶7 · Physics cannot explain biology because intention is out of physics, where nothing is
good or bad. In physics, we cannot even express that death is bad. Contrariwise, each
problem expresses an intention, which is to find at least one of its solutions. And then,
after equating life to the problem of survival, life provides the intention. A consequence
is that, under problem solving, a model is evaluated by itself and not by comparing it
with any original: a model is good if and only if the modeling subject can use it to solve
the problem that he is facing, ultimately a survival sub-problem.
§34 Putnam’s solutions revisited
¶1 · Before concluding, we should revisit Putnam’s (1988) solutions for the intentional
concepts and check them against our subjectivist proposal. Intentional concepts, as those
three that Putnam analyzes —truth, reference, and meaning—, are linguistic. Therefore,
to explain them it is required to investigate language, which is a human peculiarity. And
then, using our subjectivist approach, the key to explain those three concepts is to study
the subject of language.
¶2 · The key insight about language was given by Tomasello (2008): a language is not
useful for competition, it is only useful for cooperation. From our problematic point of
view, cooperation happens when two or more individuals share a problem that they are
resolving together, that is, when they share a common intention. It is only in these cir-
cumstances that communicating true information is valuable. In competition, confusing
the enemy is most valuable. And basically, as Tomasello points out, the main difference
between humans and apes is that we are cooperative and they are competitive.
¶3 · Under this light, Putnam’s solution for truth, “truth is idealized rational acceptabil-
ity” (page 115), sounds odd. We need the concept of truth because what is said can be
false, for example when a seller is lying to get more money for something. So language
can be used to cooperate or to compete, to help or to confuse, and then what is said in
language can be useful to solve our problems or not, that is, it can be true or false. This
is not the truth by Tarski, nor by anyone who ignores the subject of language, who is
also the subject of logic.
¶4 · Putnam’s reference is more focused: “it is a matter of interpretation” (page 118),
which should call for an interpreter, but “interpretation is an essentially holistic matter”,
which is to say that reference cannot be analyzed. However, from our point of view,
interpretation is a purely subjective matter. And, as we have already said above, in §15,
subjective does not always mean relative.
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¶5 · Putnam’s solution for meaning is linked to his solution for reference (page 119):
[. . . ;] knowing what the words in a language mean (and without knowing what
they mean, one cannot say what they refer to) is a matter of grasping the way
they are used. But use is holistic; [. . . ].
Again, from “meaning is use” and “use is holistic”, he is saying that meaning cannot be
analyzed. And again for us, meaning is a purely subjective matter. And then meaning
can be analyzed by taking into account the subject of language.
¶6 · Putnam is insisting in the holistic nature of reference and meaning because, only if
a concept can be analyzed, can this concept be part of a scientific theory. Therefore,
if reference and meaning were holistic or non-analyzable concepts, as Putnam argues,
then they could not be scientific, which is his point. And our point is that they can be
analyzed, subjectively.
¶7 · Benefiting from Tomasello’s key insight, we infer that language is useful only when two
or more individuals are resolving a problem cooperatively together, resulting that truths,
references and meanings have to be shared among the cooperating resolvers. Then, and
only in this sense, can we agree with Putnam and affirm, see §2, that ‘meanings are not
in the head’ but shared by the community of speakers. Nevertheless, this explanation is
deceptive because, though shared and negotiated, the meanings are in the heads of the
individuals who compose the community of speakers. However deceptive, at least we can
understand Putnam’s mantra in that sense.
§35 Conclusion
¶1 · For Putnam (1988), there cannot be any intentional science, thus dooming cognitive
science. His argument is that intentional concepts are functional, and that functionalism
cannot explain anything because “everything has every functional organization” (page
xv), with a proof in the Appendix (pages 121–125).
¶2 · Trying to save cognitive science, we analyze Putnam’s proof, finding that his proof
uses an ideal interpreting subject who can compute effortlessly and who is not intentional.
These two simplifying assumptions are rooted in the mind-body split by Descartes, which
was the cause of the huge success of objective science, as described by Popper’s method.
However, this shows that Putnam’s proof does not apply to us, because we are real
and intentional subjects, as described by Feyerabend, so our plan to nullify Putnam’s
argument is to replace the ideal subject with a human subject. In summary, our plan is
to update subjectivism by Kant.
¶3 · We assume that all intentions derive from life, which is the intention of not to die, or
paraphrasing Shakespeare: ‘to die, or not to die, that is the problem.’ A consequence is
that our reason is evolutionary as by Darwin, rather than transcendental as by Kant. In
other words, our reason neither guide us to seek truth, nor towards ethical justice, nor
to wise knowledge, but it is what it is just to keep us alive.
¶4 · To deal mathematically with intentions, we need intuitionism, because problems re-
quire ignorance. So, in order to model intentionality, we use a problem theory which is
an intuitionist set theory where the resolving subject is a computing device, as suggested
by Turing and Post. Computing kind-of-miraculous properties, thus qualified by Gödel,
argue in favor of its leading rôle in cognitive science. Consequently, we propose the laws
of Turing and Post as the first and the fundamental laws of cognitive science.
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¶5 · We have also presented two other laws of cognition, which could explain the evolution
of cognition in five main stages: mechanism, adapter, perceiver, learner, and subject. Five
stages require four transitions, which are: body extension, body interiorization inside the
brain, brain extension, and brain interiorization inside the brain. The first interioriza-
tion generates perceptions which are organized as an objective reality, and the second
interiorization, fully enabled by Turing completeness, generates a linguistic conceptual
world. This evolution would explain the concept-percept split, and its variants, as the




¶6 · I hope that all these arguments can convince you that cognitive science is possible.
Fortunately, for cognitive science to be possible, it is not necessary that every one of my
proposals here are right because, though I am doing my best, sadly some will be wrong.
Nevertheless, I would bet that, in the end, evolutionary subjectivism modeled as problem
solving by computing will be the “different —and better— way of thinking about these
philosophical issues.”
¶7 · Lastly, I do not know what is the intention of intention. In the theory presented in
this paper, intention is an undefined primitive concept on which other concepts are built.
However, the final intention is to not die. It is certain that, for all us living beings, death is
absolute. Therefore, I cannot say why there is intentionality instead of no intentionality,
but I can say why there is something instead of nothing. There is something instead of
nothing because we perceive things in order to survive, but I do not know why we want
to survive. To me, the intention of intention is where every explanation finally breaks
and fails.
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§36 Appendix: Putnam’s theorem
Our plan
¶1 · Putnam (1988), pages 121–125, proves the following theorem:
Every ordinary open system is a realization of every abstract finite automaton.
¶2 · An abstract finite automaton, also known as finite-state automaton, is a mathematical
concept, so it does not need further specifications, see for example Mealy (1955), but an
ordinary open system requires some additional physical stipulations in order to fit it
into a mathematical theorem. So before the proof, Putnam explains the two Physical
Principles that he needs: the Principle of Continuity and the Principle of Noncyclical
Behavior. The Principle of Continuity is needed to adapt the ordinary system, which is
modeled by physics as existing in an analog world, to the digital world of abstract finite
automata. And Putnam assures us that the Principle of Noncyclical Behavior is true for
any physical system affected by a clock, and that every open system is affected.
¶3 · We will proceed otherwise. Instead of assuming that every ordinary open system is
affected by a clock, we will use a clock as system. This way we can completely ignore the
physics of the theorem, including the two Physical Principles, and we can instead focus
on its mathematical content. So we will restate Putnam’s theorem in a simpler way by
using a simple clock instead of the ordinary open system, we will prove it following his
trail, and we will analyze the consequences.
Simpler theorem
¶4 · We will prove the simpler theorem:
Every simple clock is a realization of every abstract finite automaton.
Definition
¶5 · A simple clock is one that implements the successor function, so its starting state is 0,
and the next state is the next natural number. So for any simple clock s0 = 0, s1 = 1,
s2 = 2, and in general sn = n, where n ∈ N.
Proof
¶6 · Any finite string of states, generated by any abstract finite automaton, can be realized
by any simple clock using the following rule: assign the disjunction of the positions
where it appears to each state in the string. For example, for string ABABABA, define
A = 0∨ 2∨ 4∨ 6 and B = 1∨ 3∨ 5. Using these definitions, the clock realizes the string.
Q.E.D.?
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Analysis
¶7 · As you can see, our proof has distilled the essence of Putnam’s proof, avoiding any
possible distraction. The analysis is now easier.
¶8 · The simple clock is perhaps the simplest clock, but the only requirement that any
clock has to fulfill is that it cannot repeat any state. If, for example sj = sn, where j ̸= n,
that is, if state at time j were repeated at time n, not necessarily consecutive, then it
could not realize every finite-state automaton, but only those that were at the same state
at times j and n. The simple clock does not repeat any state, thus providing a unique
index. In Putnam’s proof, the Principle of Noncyclical Behavior grants a unique index.
¶9 · Using the simple clock, the rule used in our proof defines a partial function f that
assigns a state of the finite-state automaton to the first natural numbers. Following the
example, f(0) = A, f(1) = B, f(2) = A, f(3) = B, f(4) = A, f(5) = B, and f(6) = A.
We will call this function the interpreting function.
¶10·So the simple clock generates a series 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, which is transformed by the
interpreting function into the series f(0), f(1), f(2), f(3), f(4), f(5), f(6) that realizes the
string generated by the finite-state automaton ABABABA.
¶11·By the simple clock definition above, we know that the next state of the simple clock
will be s7 = 7, but we cannot use the simple clock to foresee what will be the next state
of the finite-state automaton. To make that prediction we will need to know the value of
the interpreting function for number 7, that is, f(7). And in general, to know the state
of the finite-state automaton at any instant, we will need to know the total version of the
interpreting function, that is, the value of f(n) for any n ∈ N.
¶12·What indeed realizes the finite-state automaton is not the simple clock, which only
provides a temporal index, but the interpreting function, which is not just a device of
the proof, as it seemed to be. In other words, what the proof shows is this slightly
augmented three-part theorem: Using suitable interpreting functions, every simple clock
is a realization of every abstract finite automaton. Putnam’s theorem requires the same
amendment.
¶13·Since Turing’s (1937) proof, we know that realizing a function is equivalent to com-
puting the function, where ‘realizing’ means ‘effectively calculating’ as in Church’s (1935)
thesis. As this is true for any function, it applies also to every interpreting function:
Realizing any interpreting function is computing it.
Comment
¶14·In Casares (PR), you can find a discussion about a similar simplification by Chalmers
(1996), and references to other three-part solutions to the problem of implementation by
Blackmon (2013) and Giunti (2017).
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